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NOTE
Gestational Surrogacy: Legal Implications of Reproductive Technology
I. INTRODUCION
Modem medical technology is significantly impacting the legal field
by creating new emerging ethical issues. The spectrum of issues
ranges from Dr. Kevorkian and his suicide machine,1 to the pur-
poseful and deliberate conception of a child to serve as a bone mar-
row cell donor to an older sibling,2 to parental rights of gestational
surrogates. This note will focus on Johnson v. Calvert, a case of first
impression out of the Supreme Court of California, which examines
the issue of gestational surrogacy and the parental rights of the non-
genetically related surrogate mother to a baby.' The court in Johnson
v. Calvert4 provides the first legal interpretation of gestational surro-
gacy contracts, examines the related public policy considerations, and
interprets the definition of "natural mother" found in the Uniform
Parentage Act.5
A surrogate is defined as a person who takes the place of another.6
The surrogate mother takes the place of an infertile woman by bear-
ing a child who will be raised by the contracting couple. Gestational
surrogacy differs greatly from the more widely known practice of sur-
rogate motherhood. In the more traditional surrogate motherhood
situations, the surrogate mother is typically inseminated with the
sperm of the donor husband of a childless couple. The surrogate
mother's egg provides the other half of the genetic material to pro-
duce the zygote. She then carries the fetus to term, delivers, and relin-
quishes possession of the baby to the married couple.7 By contrast, in
gestational surrogacy, the surrogate gestator has the zygote of the
1. Kathleen Byland, Judge Temporarily Restrains Suicide "Angel of Death," REurEms,
June 8, 1990, at 72.
2. Lance Morrow, When One Body Can Save Another, TIME, June 17, 1991, at 54.
3. 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993).
4. Id.
5. Uniform Parentage Act, CAL Civ. CODE §§ 7000-7021 (West 1993). The purpose of the
Uniform Parentage Act was to eliminate the legal distinction between legitimate and illegitimate
children.
6. WnasTER's NEW COLLEoIATE DicnONARY 1165 (2D ED. 1979).
7. Alice Hofheimer, Gestational Surrogacy: Unsettling State Parentage Law and Surrogacy
Policy, 19 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc CHANGE 571, 572 (1993).
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couple implanted in her womb, gestates, and delivers a child to whom
she is genetically unrelated.
Johnson v. Calvert is the first case which addresses the legal implica-
tions which arise when a gestational surrogacy contract goes awry.8
The question of how to determine maternal rights arises when one
woman supplies the ovum, when another woman gestates and gives
birth to the child, and when both "mothers" claim right to the child.9
While gestational surrogacy is a product of modern technology, with
reminiscent Brave New World overtones 10 , surrogacy has historically
been in existence since biblical times. The Bible notes two occasions
where surrogate mothers provided infertile women with children. In
the Old Testament, Abraham's barren wife, Sarah, sets into motion
the first documented surrogacy relationship when she coaxes Abra-
ham to "go in to my maid" Hagar and states "[y]ou see that the Lord
has not allowed me to bear a child. Take my slave-girl; perhaps I shall
found a family through her."'1 A second illustration focuses on
Rachel, the infertile wife of Jacob, tells him, "[h]ere is my slave-girl
Bilhah. Lie with her, so that she may bear sons to be laid upon my
knees, and through her I too may build up a family."' 2 Although
there were no doctors and lawyers involved in these early surrogacy
arrangements, the basic objective for the procedure and exploitation
of the surrogate mother has not changed since biblical times. One
commentator has suggested that the role of the Egyptian slave girl is
now, in the present, still primarily performed by women of color. 3
This note will examine the legal implications regarding gestational
surrogacy from constitutional and contractual theories, will briefly dis-
cuss holdings on the issue from various jurisdictions, and will focus on
public policy concerns. Some part of the policy discussion will center
on the exploitation of lower socio-economic and typically minority
women from an economic, physical, and psychological perspective.'
4
II. SUMMARY OF THE CASE
A. Facts Behind the Suit
Mark and Crispina Calvert, a married couple, were unable to have a
child. In 1984, Crispina had a hysterectomy to combat cancer. Her
8. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 796.
9. Hofheimer, supra note 7, at 571.
10. A. HuxiLY, BRAvE NEw WoRLD (1932).
11. Genesis 16:2.
12. Genesis 30:3-5.
13. Sherri Lynne Russell-Brown, Parental Rights and Gestational Surrogacy: An Argument
Against the Genetic Standard, 23 CoLum. HUM. Rrs. L. REv. 525, 542 (1992).
14. Katherine B. Lieber, Selling the Womb: Can the Feminist Critique of Surrogacy Be An-
swered?, 68 IND. L.J. 205 (1992).
2
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ovaries remained capable of producing eggs, however, so the couple
decided to pursue a surrogacy arrangement." In 1990, Mark and Cris-
pina Calvert entered into a gestational surrogacy contract with Anna
Johnson. 16 The contract provided that Crispina's egg which had been
inseminated with Mark's sperm would be implanted in Anna; and af-
ter birth, the child would be taken into the Calvert's home as their
own child.' 7 Anna. agreed to relinquish all parental rights to the child,
and in return, she would be paid ten thousand dollars in a series of
installments.'8 Mark was Caucasian of European ancestry, Crispina
was Asian of Philippine ancestry, and Anna was black of African-
American ancestry. 19'
After the implantation of the zygote on January 19, 1990, relations
between the Calverts and Anna deteriorated.20 In July of 1990, Anna
sent the Calverts a letter demanding the balance of the money due
under the contract and further stating that she would not give up the
baby unless the Calverts sent the money.2' In August of 1990, the
Calverts sought a declaration that they were the legal parents of the
unborn child.22 A healthy baby boy named Christopher was born on
September 19, 1990.23 Blood samples excluded Anna as the genetic
mother, and the parties agreed to a court order which provided that
the baby would remain with the Calverts on a temporary basis with
visitation permitted by Anna prior to trial.24
B. Prior Proceedings
1. The Trial
The action was filed in Orange County, California Superior Court
in 1990. The trial court ruled that the Calverts were the child's ge-
netic, biological, and natural parents and that Anna had no parental
rights to the child.25 The court also held that the surrogacy contract
was legal and enforceable. The court then terminated the order which
permitted Anna visitation with the baby.26 Anna appealed.
15. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 778.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Anita L. Allen, The Black Surrogate Mother, 8 HARV. BLAcKLETrER J. 17, 18 (1991).
The significance of the ethnic and racial characteristics of the parties will be analyzed in text
accompanying notes 56-58.
20. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 496.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Allen, supra note 19, at 18.
24. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 778.
25. Id.
26. Id.
1995]
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2. Appellate Court
On appeal, the California Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed
the trial court's decision. The court held that a woman who agreed to
have a couple's fertilized egg implanted in her womb and who carried
the child to term was not the "natural" or "legal" mother of the
child. 27 The wife who supplied the egg and the husband who supplied
the sperm were deemed the "natural parents" of the child.28 More-
over, the court held that the gestational surrogate was not deprived of
any constitutional interests.29
C. Supreme Court of California: Decision and Rationale
The California Supreme Court, in affirming the prior decisions, held
that the Uniform Parentage Act (hereinafter the Act) facially applies
to any parentage determination, including rare instances in which the
child's maternity is at issue.3°
The court found that the Act's legislative purpose was to eliminate
the legal distinction between legitimate and illegitimate children and
was not motivated by the need to resolve surrogacy disputes.31
Although the court had the opportunity to disregard the Act, because
of the lack of legislative direction on the maternity issue, it held that
the Act applied on its face to any parentage determination.32 The
court reasoned that while the Act may not have been specifically
designed for the issue of maternity, it provided a mechanism to re-
solve the dispute.
Under California law, the Act looks to the intention of the parties
to parent the child in determining who is the natural mother when
genetic consanguinity and the act of giving birth do not coincide.33
The court found support from many legal scholars in adopting the in-
tent standard and reasoned that "the child would not have been born
but for the efforts of the intended parents."'
The court held that gestational surrogacy does not run afoul of
prohibitions on involuntary servitude and found no potential for coer-
cion or duress in the contract issue. The court reasoned that all the
parties understood that a pregnant woman has the absolute right to
27. Anna J. v. Mark C., 286 Cal. Rptr. 369 (Cal. App. 4th 1991).
28. Id. at 369.
29. I& at 377.
30. Uniform Parentage Act, CAL- Civ. CODE §§ 7000-7021 (West 1993).
31. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 778-79.
32. Id at 779.
33. Id. at 782.
34. Id The standard the Court adopted in deciding the case was the "intent" of the efforts
of the parents by which the child could not have been born but for the efforts of the intended
parents. Id.
4
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abort or not abort any fetus she is carrying and that any promise to
the contrary is unenforceable.3 5
The court strongly stated.that it was unpersuaded that gestational
surrogacy contracts would exploit or dehumanize women of lower
economic status. It acknowledged that women of lesser means typi-
cally serve as surrogates but stated that there was no proof that surro-
gacy contracts exploited these women to any greater degree than the
general exploits of poorly paying and undesirable employment.36 In a
single sentence, the court dismissed any claim that children will be
seen as mere commodities.37 While the court took a strong stand on
the issue, it lacked firm statistics, empirical data, and legal reasoning.
D. Concurrence and Dissent
a. Concurrence
Justice Arabian concurred in the holding of the majority opinion
rendered by Justice Panelli for the court but declined to subscribe to
the dictum which found surrogacy contracts not inconsistent with pub-
lic policy. He acknowledged that surrogacy contracts touch upon one
of the most sensitive subjects of human endeavor, and stated that the
area of surrogacy should be addressed in the nonadversarial legislative
forum. 3 8
b. Dissent
Justice Kennard contended that the legal standard applicable to this
type of case should be the one which is most protective to the child's
welfare. He posited that the Johnson decision should have been one
based on the "best interest of the child" rather than on "intent".39
Kennard addressed the majority's four major arguments and deter-
mined that the rigid reliance on the intent of the genetic mother will
not serve the best interests of the child in all circumstances. 4° He con-
cluded by stating that his proposed "best interest" standard examines
who can best assume the social and legal responsibilities of mother-
hood for a child born out of a gestational surrogacy arrangement.4
35. Id. at 784.
36. Id. at 785.
37. Id. at 784.
38. Id at 788.
39. Id.
40. Id at 794-98.
41. Id. at 800.
1995]
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III. PRIOR LAW AND PRACricE
Modern medical technology has vastly broadened and greatly
benefitted the society in which we live. Today we are provided with
medical and health choices and a quality of life unimaginable a gener-
ation or two ago. However, modem medical technology may have
opened a Pandora's box. While surrogate motherhood can serve as a
highly feasible alternative to infertile couples, there is the potential
that gestational surrogacy can open the door to the exploitation of
those who lack bargaining power. Further, while there are four thou-
sand children living in this country who are positive products of surro-
gacy arrangements, 42 there are also losers in the surrogacy game.
The best known surrogate motherhood situation was widely publi-
cized and legally debated in the well known case of In re Baby M.
43
The surrogate mother, Mary Beth Whitehead Gould, failed in her at-
tempt to get custody of her genetically related child. The contracting
parents, the Sterns, left the courthouse with the prized possession."
The Johnson case differs from Baby M. in that there was no genetic
link between the baby and the surrogate mother45 as in Baby M. 6
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Constitutional Theory
While the California Supreme Court clearly stated that constitu-
tional rights are not implicated in gestational surrogacy because the
surrogate can terminate the pregnancy at her will, the court's decision
is lacking in substance and patronizing to women.
The constitutional implications of gestational surrogacy are broad in
scope. The Supreme Court has recognized the right to privacy as a
fundamental right protected by the United States Constitution. The
recognition of this fundamental right was carved out in Griswold v.
Connecticut,47 where the Court found unconstitutional a state statute
forbidding the use of contraceptives. The Supreme Court further ex-
panded the notion of procreative freedom in Eisenstadt v. Baird,' in
which it overruled a statute which prohibited the sale of contracep-
tives to unmarried couples.
42. Stephen G. York, A Contractual Analysis of Surrogate Motherhood and a Proposed So-
lution, 24 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 395, 396 (1991).
43. 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
44. Brent Parker Smith, Anna J. v. Mark C.: Proof of the Imminent Need for Surrogate
Motherhood Regulation, 30 J. FAM. L. 493, 493 (1992).
45. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 778.
46. 537 A.2d at 1235.
47. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
48. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
6
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The Johnson trial court decision49 included surrogacy among consti-
tutionally protected procreative rights by extending such rights to the
infertile. ° Yet, the court failed to recognize the procreative right of
the gestator.5' The court's brief consideration of the constitutional
rights of the gestator is a dodged issue. The court's one sentence
which states that surrogacy contracts do not run afoul of the constitu-
tional prohibitions on involuntary servitude52 is insulting lip service to
women.
Johnson sparked a new wave of concern that gestational surrogate
motherhood turns women into commercial slaves twenty-four hours a
day for 270 days.5 3 The trial judge analogized the unique role of the
gestational surrogate first to that of a foster parent who provides care,
protection, and nurture during the period that the natural mother was
unable to, and second to that of a wet nurse who merely provides
essential nutrition 4.5  Both arrangements, fostering parenthood and
wet-nursing, leave the "service" provider without legal recourse in the
form of custodial or visitation rights. The court must address whether
satisfaction of the strong desire to have one's own genetically related
children is worth the social price of surrogacy arrangements. 5
B. Contractual Theory
Because the right to contract is generally afforded broad protection
by the law, it would seem that the courts may enforce a contract, sup-
ported by consideration, into which all parties enter willingly.56 How-
ever, jurisdictions differ on the legality of surrogacy contracts. If the
court declares that the practice of surrogacy is unprotected by the
Constitution and is illegal, then any surrogacy contract becomes unen-
forceable. Courts will not enforce a contract which provides for the
performance of an illegal act. This highlights the underlying contrac-
tual doctrine of unconscionabiity.57 Unconscionability has a twofold
purpose, to prevent oppression and to prevent unfair surprise.5" The
49. Johnson v. Calvert, No. X633190 consolidated with AD5738 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 22,
1990) (transcript).
50. Id.
51. Smith, supra note 44, at 506-07.
52. Johnson, No. X633190 at *15. The trial judge was sure that the "genetic" mother and
not the "carrying person" has whatever procreative rights the Supreme Court established as
fundamental. Id. "I think, probably, as I see it, there are some constitutional problems with
trying to outlaw [surrogacy agreements] all together." IM
53. Allen, supra note 19, at 17.
54. Hofheimer, supra note 7, at 582.
55. Allen, supra note 19, at 21.
56. Smith, supra note 44, at 503.
57. JoHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CoNRALcrs § 9-40, at 403 (3d 1987).
58. Id.
1995]
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surrogate mother is typically found in a lower socio-economic status
and is a prime candidate to fall victim to unconscionable oppression.
In the commercial surrogacy context, the surrogate mother usually
creates a child not because she wants to be magnanimous, but because
she wants to earn a specified fee.59 This clearly exemplifies the ex-
ploitation of the poor. Typically, the surrogate mother is paid a total
of ten thousand dollars in installments, for her services.60 A wage of
ten thousand dollars for nine months is equivalent to a wage of one
dollar and fifty-four cents per hour if one considers surrogate mother-
hood a twenty-four-hour-a-day job.6 1
A further harm in upholding the constitutional validity of gesta-
tional surrogacy contracts is the devaluation of human life by "baby
selling." Baby selling is a demeaning practice which treats children
like commodities that can be bought or sold on an open market.62 A
stance must be taken, and it should be acknowledged that childbear-
ing is too sacred and too personal to commercialize. 63 By turning the
womb into a commodity, many feminists fear that society will once
again value women primarily for their reproductive capacities.6"
C. Where the States Lie in Gestational Surrogacy Legislation
A survey of the jurisdictions shows varying approaches to the legal
issue of surrogacy. Arizona, Indiana, and North Dakota have re-
sponded by making any type of surrogacy contract void and unen-
forceable. Kentucky, Louisiana, Nebraska, Utah, and Washington
have taken the position that surrogacy contracts are voidable, not ille-
gal and void.65 Michigan takes the strongest stance by criminalizing
surrogacy.66 The Virginia and New Hampshire legislatures have en-
acted statutes which permit surrogacy contracts and establish exten-
sive schemes governing their terms and enforcement.67 The California
trial court in Johnson held that surrogacy contracts are not void or
against public policy and urged that such contracts should be en-
forced, even by means of habeas corpus.68 Approximately sixteen
states have adopted or adapted the Uniform Parentage Act.69 If other
59. Lieber, supra note 14, at 209.
60. Russell-Brown, supra note 13, at 541.
61. Id.
62. Smith, supra note 44, at 505.
63. Loi A. DeMond, Note, The Ongoing Uncertainty of Surrogacy, 63 B.Y.U. L. REv. 686,
688 (1991).
64. Lieber, supra note 14, at 209.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Allen, supra note 19, at 22.
69. Hofleimer, supra note 7, at 573.
8
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states interpret "natural mother" as the California court did, Johnson
could stand as the forerunner of such decisions.70
D. Public Policy Concerns and Feminist Perspectives
In the gestational surrogacy realm, there is fertile ground for public
policy concerns. The main tenet of feminism is that women should not
have their destiny controlled by their biology.71 In Western cultures,
social roles have been defined by the fact that only women can be-
come pregnant, and women are given the primary responsibility of
rearing children.72 The feminist community appears to be split on the
issue of surrogacy. A small minority of feminist writers believe that
surrogacy is one of the many ieproductive choices from which women
should be free to choose.73 Most feminist scholars see surrogacy as a
form of slavery or prostitution in which the surrogate is exploited
through either one or both of the enticements of money or the social
expectation of self-sacrifice. 74 Many feminists fear that surrogates will
be turned into a class of breeders and that a reproductive brothel will
emerge.75
Another major area of concern is the potential for actual psycholog-
ical and physical harm to women.76 While proponents of surrogacy
argue that it is a woman's choice to use her body in any way she sees
fit, most believe that commercial surrogacy will lead to the exploita-
tion of women through economic and societal pressures.77 The psy-
chological trauma of a baby being stripped from the arms of the
surrogate mother after a change of heart is unimaginably heart-
wrenching. Medical inquiry into the issue has found that hormonal
changes during pregnancy make it impossible for the surrogate to de-
termine how she will feel about relinquishing possession and parental
rights of the child.78
The holding in Johnson clearly suggests the possibility that the
courts will litigate difficult circumstances faced by gestational surro-
gacy participants when the scientific miracle of birth goes awry.79 In
cases of infertility, surrogacy arrangements have allowed infertile
couples to experience the joys of parenthood. Children of such ar-
70. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 776.
71. Leiber, supra note 14, at 209.
72. Id. at 210.
73. It at 209.
74. Id.
75. Id at 210.
76. I
77. It. at 209.
78. Id. at 211-212.
79. Benefits do exist in "individual cases" of surrogacy arrangements when the agreements
are followed with no dispute.
1995]
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rangements are born where life once was an impossibility, and some
surrogates really do benefit from the gift of life, either psychologically
or financially. Yet, the masses of women who are physically and psy-
chologically harmed far outweigh the small number of women who
feel fulfilled by such arrangements.8° Unfortunately, it becomes a
cost-benefit analysis with the costs greatly outweighing the benefits to
women. The courts should take this opportunity to reflect on such
harmful side effects and to act by deciding case law in an according
manner. Legislatures should prohibit such contractual relationships
which are detrimental to women and children.
IV. CONCLUSION
The court's holding in Calvert v. Johnson leaves many questions un-
answered.8 ' The greatest of these questions is whether satisfaction of
the strong desire to have one's own genetically related child is worth
the social price of a surrogacy arrangement. The legal relationship
between a surrogate gestator mother and her child is complex. While
no genetic linkage is present, there is a nine month gestation period
and a birthing process that the surrogate and child share exclusively.
While some view the surrogate relationship as a mere contractual ser-
vice, in reality, the issue is a multifaceted and deep one. Justice Ara-
bian is correct that the multiplicity of considerations at issue do
require careful, nonadversarial analysis in a legislative forum.' The
magnitude and severity of public policy considerations demand imme-
diate legislative attention and action.
ERIKA HESSENTHALER*
80. York, supra note 42, at 399.
81. Leiber, supra note 14, at 209.
82. i
* For Meinen Vater, Walter Hessenthaler, 20 XI 28 - 13 XI 92.
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